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Abstract: The only feelings we can feel are our own. When it comes to the feelings of others, 
we can only infer them, based on their behavior — unless they tell us. This is the “other-minds 
problem.” Within our own species, thanks to language, this problem arises only for states in 
which people cannot speak (infancy, aphasia, sleep, anaesthesia, coma). Our species also has 
a uniquely powerful empathic or “mind-reading” capacity: We can (sometimes) perceive from 
the behavior of others when they are in states like our own. Our inferences have also been 
systematized and operationalized in biobehavioral science and supplemented by cognitive 
neuroimagery. Together, these make the other-minds problem within our own species a 
relatively minor one. But we cohabit the planet with other species, most of them very different 
from our own, and none of them able to talk. Inferring whether and what they feel is important 
not only for scientific but also for ethical reasons, because where feelings are felt, they can 
also be hurt. As animals are at long last beginning to be accorded legal status and protection 
as sentient beings, our new journal Animal Sentience, will be devoted to exploring in depth 
what, how and why organisms feel. Individual “target articles” (and sometimes précis of 
books) addressing different species’ sentient and cognitive capacities will each be accorded 
“open peer commentary,” consisting of multiple shorter articles, both invited and freely 
submitted ones, by specialists from many disciplines, each elaborating, applying, 
supplementing or criticizing the content of the target article, along with responses from the 
target author(s). The members of the nonhuman species under discussion will not be able to 
join in the conversation, but their spokesmen and advocates, the specialists who know them 
best, will. The inaugural issue launches with the all-important question (for fish) of whether 
fish can feel pain.  
 
 
Stevan Harnad harnad@uqam.ca is Professor of cognitive science at Université du 
Québec à Montréal and University of Southampton. His research is on category 
learning, language evolution, consciousness, and open access. Founder and former 
editor of the journal Behavioral and Brain Sciences, Harnad is becoming increasingly 
active in the problems of animal welfare, animal rights and animal law. 
https://isc.uqam.ca/en/component/savrepertoireprofesseurs/ficheProfesseur.html?mId=ZOAHV0jyfrM 
 
Call for Commentary:  Animal Sentience publishes Open Peer Commentary on all accepted target 
articles. Target articles are peer-reviewed. Commentaries are editorially reviewed. There are 
submitted commentaries as well as invited commentaries. Commentaries appear as soon as they 
have been revised and accepted. Target article authors may respond to their commentaries 
individually or in a joint response to multiple commentaries.  
Instructions: http://animalstudiesrepository.org/animsent/guidelines.html 
 




The other-minds problem. The difference between mind-reading and bird-watching is that 
only one of them can be done by observation alone (unless you are trying to mind-read birds). 
Birds can be identified and their habitats and behavior can be described on the basis of 
observation. But minds cannot be observed: Only their behavior can be observed. What 
minds are feeling and thinking can only be inferred from what their bodies are doing. This is 
the other-minds problem (Harnad 1991). 
 
Is the other-minds problem unique to the biological study of organisms with minds? Or are 
minds just one among many examples of things in the world that we cannot observe but can 
only infer?  
 
Physicists cannot observe superstrings (they are not yet even sure they exist). Until very 
recently they thought that although quarks are much bigger than hadrons, a hadron is a 
combination of multiple quarks in a “bound” state, and only the individual little hadrons 
themselves are observable. The big quarks of which the little hadrons are composed cannot 
occur as free individuals, so they are unobservable. Yet the existence and properties of quarks 
can be inferred from the observable behavior of hadrons. Indeed, the existence of bound 
quarks is necessary in order to explain the behavior of hadrons, according to current physical 
theory (Phillips 1999). Is this not like mind-reading? 
 
The “hard problem.” Inferring quarks is like inferring minds only up to a point. Organisms 
really do have minds, just as hadrons really do have quarks. But there the analogy ends. It is 
far from true that their having minds is necessary to explain organisms’ observable behavior, 
in the way that their having quarks is necessary to explain hadrons’ observable behavior. 
Rather, explaining how and why organisms have minds remains a profound and unsolved 
problem — one that has lately come to be dubbed the “hard problem” (Chalmers 1995) of 
cognitive science (the science of the mind).  
 
If we interpret Darwinian biology in an unbiased, non-anthropocentric way, organisms 
should just be survival/reproduction machines: robots that have the capacity — through blind 
genetic variation and natural selection — to evolve the structures and functions that increase 
their chances of surviving and reproducing (Goodwin & Dawkins 1995). Those structures and 
functions include not only the shapes and functions of organisms’ bodies, but also their 
behavioral capacities and the neural basis of those capacities, from moving, swimming, flying, 
hunting, foraging and mating to learning, competing, cooperating, communicating and even 
speaking.  
 
The “easy problem.” If organisms were indeed mindless, then there would only be the “easy 
problem” of explaining how and why organisms can do all those things they can do (swim, 
fly, learn, communicate) (Harnad 2012). But if organisms do have minds, the hard problem 
is to explain how and why such survival/reproduction machines would evolve minds: What 
is the added causal role and adaptive value of having a mind, over and above the causal role 
and adaptive value of just having the behavioral capacities themselves, to do whatever needs 
doing in order to survive and reproduce: those behavioral capacities that the slow but 
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growing successes of modern robotics are showing to be implementable mindlessly (Arkin 
1998; Samani 2015)?  
 
But evidently organisms do have minds, for some reason or other — or at least some species 
do: Which ones? Clearly our own species does. Which others? And what does it mean to “have 
a mind”?  
 
Descartes’s “Cogito.” Descartes did not discover or invent the notion of a mind, but he did 
give it a concrete, almost operational definition: the “Cogito” (“I think, therefore I am.”)  
 
That’s not the simplest or clearest way to put it. The question is not so much about the 
existence of “me” but about the existence of (at least one) mind: When I am thinking, it feels 
like something to be thinking. I know what it feels like to think. I don’t infer it, in my own case. 
I observe it directly: I feel it directly. I am not just a behaving (moving) machine in a certain 
internal state, like a robot; I am feeling something (when I am awake, and not sleep-walking, 
like a robot!). My internal state is a felt state. 
 
Sentience. So Descartes might as well not have bothered to single out thinking in particular. 
It does feel like something to think, but it also feels like something to be in any other mental 
state — seeing something, hearing something, smelling something, touching something, 
moving something, expecting something, wanting something, imagining something — in fact, 
feeling anything at all: heat, cold, pain, pleasure, anger, fear, fatigue, doubt, understanding. 
Mental states are felt states, and to have a mind means to have the capacity to feel. In a word: 
sentience.  
 
The rest is indeed about cognition (i.e., thinking): Having observed (i.e., felt) directly that I 
am a sentient organism and not a mindless robot (in other words, having noted, with 
Descartes, that I feel), what can I feel, think and do — and how, and why? These are things in 
which individuals as well as species can differ.   
 
I know at first hand, in Descartes’s way, what I am feeling or thinking. Other humans can tell 
me in words what they are feeling or thinking, so I need not rely on reading their minds. And 
they can show me what they can do by doing it, and I can observe that.  
 
Mind-reading. Hence, within our own species, the other-minds problem is a relatively minor 
one. It arises only when speech is not possible and behavior is absent or minimal, such as in 
deep sleep or coma or under anaesthesia. We are confident in our inference that preverbal 
children are sentient, even though they can’t tell us, and that so too are adults who have lost 
the ability to speak. We can also infer what other people are feeling or thinking from their 
behavior (and sometimes also from measuring the electrical activity in their brains). This is 
part of how we mind-read one another within our own species, based on behavior, on what 
people say, and (if we are brain scientists) on what we can measure of what is going on in 
other people’s brains. 
 
But there is something more. It can be said without exaggeration that the members of our 
species are extraordinarily gifted at mind-reading one another (Premack & Woodruff 1978; 
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Krebs & Dawkins 1984; Ickes 2003; Baron-Cohen 2005; Domes et al. 2007). Our rational, 
observational and empathic mind-reading skills in general are far more extensive and acute 
than those of any other species. All mammals (at least1) do have some degree of mind-reading 
ability, especially concerning the needs of their young; social species have even more of it. 
Some researchers have attributed organisms’ mind-reading abilities to their having “mirror 
neurons,” which are active both when an organism itself does (and, presumably, feels) 
something and when the organism observes another organism doing (and, presumably, 
feeling) the same thing (Gallese & Goldman 1998; Vogeley et al. 2001; Rizzolatti & Craighero 
2005; Singer 2006). But whatever its neural basis, human beings are the planet’s unrivalled 
champions in mind-reading one another. 
 
Other species. What about human mind-reading of other species? When it comes to other 
mammals as well as birds, the other-minds problem does not arise for the question of whether 
they feel. Everyone who has had animals in the family knows that they feel, as surely as 
human infants feel. Our acute mind-reading ability assures us of that. But when it comes to 
the question of what it is that members of other species are feeling and thinking, the answer 
is not always so obvious. The problem becomes more and more challenging the more 
different the species’ behavior and ecology is from ours, sometimes misleading 2  our 
formidable mind-reading skills (and mirror neurons) and sometimes downright stumping 
them (Hughes 1999; Jones 2005). 
 
Descartes had already answered the question of what it means to have a mind: It means to 
have the capacity to feel, to be sentient, rather than just the capacity to do, like a robot. 
However, although he was the supreme advocate of rationality — and pointed out with his 
Cogito that it would be irrational, indeed self-contradictory, for us to doubt that we are feeling 
when we are indeed feeling — Descartes nevertheless lapsed from rationality into arbitrary 
opinion when it came to the minds of members of species other than his own. He had 
contrasted the certainty with which we each know that we have a mind with our uncertainty 
not only about one another’s minds, but also about the laws of science: Yes, other people 
probably feel too, and the laws of science are probably correct, but we can’t be sure of that, 
the way we can be sure of the truth of a mathematical theorem — or of the truth of the Cogito. 
 
Mindless machines. Fair enough. We can’t be sure. It is good to be reminded of the fallibility 
of human knowledge. But we are nevertheless sure enough that it is true that other people, 
too, feel, and that the laws of science (including the theory that hadrons are composed of 
quarks) are true. Descartes did not deny those kinds of truths; he only pointed out that they 
                                                        
1 Perhaps all R-selected animals have some mind-reading capacity for nurturing their young. R-selected 
species have relatively fewer young, but invest more into making sure they survive until they reach 
reproductive age. K-selected species invest instead in having relatively more young, but leave them to fend for 
themselves (Pianka 1970). Human selective breeding has probably emphasized these empathic capacities in 
domesticated animals, especially dogs (Yong & Ruffman 2014; Duranton & Gaunet 2015). 
2 A very sad recent example of failed mind-reading has been the widespread misperception of the arm-raising 
response of the slow loris (as seen in YouTube videos) as asking to be tickled, whereas in reality it is a 
frightened defensive response to a perceived attack. The result has been the brutal wresting of large numbers 
of the poor little creatures from their native habitat to suffer miserable fates in fulfilling the surge of demand 
for cute animals to tickle (Hagey et al. 2007; Nekaris et al. 2013).  
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are not certain, in the way that mathematical truths or the Cogito are certain. And yet when 
it came to the other-minds problem for other species, Descartes confidently asserted that, 
despite their behavior, animals are just feelingless machines — so we can go ahead and do 
whatever we like with them despite their struggles and screams (Descartes 1649/1993; 
Harrison 1992). Why?  
 
Descartes assured us that animals cannot feel on the basis of a scientific theory — rather the 
way we infer that hadrons are made of quarks on the basis of a scientific theory. But 
Descartes’s own scientific theory of mind, unlike the quark theory of hadrons, did not have 
the power to predict and explain the observable behavior of either humans or other species. 
It was in fact a quack theory, attributing the mind to the pineal gland, into which a deity had 
implanted the power to generate feeling — in humans, but not in any other species (Finger 
1995). Apart from that, the body, in all species, is just a mindless machine according to 
Descartes. 
 
Scepticism. Descartes’s scientific hypotheses are of no more interest today than other 
inchoate hunches from the 17th century, especially in biology, and especially when tainted 
with theology. Descartes’s persisting importance lies elsewhere: He tried to put science on a 
rational basis, to rescue it from the sceptics who insisted that nothing could be known to be 
true for sure. Descartes countered that the truth of the Cogito could indeed be known to be 
true for sure. Every individual knows for sure that it is true that they are thinking (when they 
are thinking). Yet, as we noted earlier, the only thing this really guarantees is that each of us 
feels: that sentience is real; that feeling really exists; that it is impossible to deny it — in our 
own individual case, at least. It certainly does not follow, however, from the undeniably true 
fact that we feel, that anything else that we may feel to be true really is true. 
 
Benefit of the doubt. Thanks to Descartes, I cannot be sceptical about the fact that I feel — 
but I can certainly still be sceptical about whether anyone else feels. That’s the other-minds 
problem yet again. The reasons we nevertheless give one another the benefit of the doubt 
have already been mentioned: Language is perhaps the first and most prominent reason: 
People can tell us they feel, just as they can tell us other things, including things we can 
confirm to be true by observation; so we tend to believe what people say. Second, we infer 
from people’s nonverbal behavior that they feel, much the way we infer that there are quarks 
from the observable behavior of hadrons. Inferring feelings helps us to predict what people 
do and to explain why they do it. The third and perhaps most palpable reason we believe 
other people have minds is that our acute mind-reading powers (sometimes) make us feel as 
if other people feel. 
 
None of these beliefs about other minds, however, inherits the certainty of Descartes’s Cogito: 
they could all have been wrong even though they felt as if they were true. And for every 
uncertain hypothesis, its opposite is likewise uncertain: I can’t be sure that others feel, 
because of the other-minds problem, but, for the very same reason, I can’t be sure that others 
don’t feel either. So what is at stake? Is this just like saying that we can’t be sure there are 
quarks, but we can’t be sure there aren’t quarks either? so we just provisionally accept the 
more probable option — the option that has more evidence supporting it?  
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Consequences of error. Picking the more likely option is partly the answer; but in the case 
of feelings, there is something far more important at stake than just the truth, namely, the 
consequences of being wrong: There is incomparably more at stake for others if we assume 
that they don’t feel, yet they do, than if we assume that they do feel, yet they don’t.3 For 
feelings, if they are indeed being felt, can be hurt. Yet we cannot feel another organism’s hurt: 
Only the other organism — the one we are wrongly assuming to be mindless — can feel the 
hurt.  
 
The other members of our own species are not at risk from our scepticism, because we have 
already accepted the overwhelming evidence that other humans feel.4 But what about other 
species? Descartes theorized that no other species than our own is sentient, whereas most 
rational people today agree that mammals and birds, at least, do feel, and hence that it would 
be monstrous to go ahead — as Descartes had advised, based on his theory — and do 
whatever we like with them despite their struggles and screams, confident that they are 
merely mindless machines. 
 
Whose other-minds problem? But what about species like fishes, who cannot scream? Or 
invertebrates, like worms or clams, some of whom can hardly even struggle? We cannot feel 
their pain — if they feel — any more than we can feel one another’s pain. Thanks to our acute 
mind-reading abilities, we grant the benefit of the doubt — to some degree — to mammals 
and birds, because they and their young resemble us (and especially resemble our young) 
(Paul 2000; Decety & Jackson 2004; Panksepp & Panksepp 2013).  
 
But even with mammals and birds, the dictates of our mind-reading abilities are easily 
dismissed as “anthropomorphic” illusions when there is a financial, personal or even a 
scientific interest in being able to do whatever we like with them, hence in seeing and treating 
them more like feelingless machines than as sentient organisms. Fish, reptiles, amphibians 
and invertebrates, if they feel, are further handicapped by the fact that even to our acute 
mind-reading sense, they look robotic.5 
 
So it turns out that the other-minds problem is not our problem: It’s the problem of other 
species, if they do have minds — if they do indeed feel, yet have the misfortune that our 
species does not know they feel, or does not believe it. Pain is the negative feeling that comes 
to mind first: The other-minds problem is a catastrophe for any sentient species that we are 
hurting because we are sceptical about whether they feel pain. But there is far more to 
negative feeling — let us frankly call it suffering — than just the infliction of brute pain. There 
is also stress and fear and loneliness — and being deprived of the other things a species may 
                                                        
3 The underlying issue here is the “cost” of false positives versus false negatives. It also arises in medicine and 
law (Menikoff 2001).  
4 Andrew Rowan (personal communication) has pointed out that it was not until recently that it was 
universally accepted that infants feel pain (Fletcher 1987; Morris 1991; Page 2004). (See also Segner 2016.) 
5 As Balcombe (2016) notes, fishes have the further disadvantage that they do not blink. (They don't need to, 
because their environments constantly bathe their eyes.) Blinks are among the important anthropomorphic 
cues engaging our mind-reading ability, as roboticists know (Yoshikawa 2006). 
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need: the habitat for which they have evolved; the possibility of seeing, hearing, tasting, 
touching and doing the things for which their sensory and motor systems are adapted and 
that they are designed to expect; and of course being deprived of freedom — and of their 
lives, which, if they feel, may feel every bit as precious to them as ours feel to us. 
 
Sensitizing to sentience. Animal Sentience (ASent) is a journal devoted to sensitizing the 
members of our own species — scientists, scholars, ethicists, veterinarians, attorneys, policy-
makers and concerned citizens — to the sentience, and hence the needs, of other sentient 
species. The objective is to help us understand what other species feel — how and why — and 
of course whether. To put it another way: the goal is to further enhance our species’ already 
powerful mind-reading abilities, across species. This means that some articles will also 
explore the boundaries of sentient life. The assumption, of course, is that it is the nervous 
system that generates feeling. But some articles will also consider simpler animals, lacking 
neurons, all the way down to unicellular organisms, and even across the frontier of the animal 
kingdom to plants: not on the expectation that all living organisms are sentient, but in order 
to get a clearer idea of what sentience is and what it is not. For this reason, there will also be 
some articles about robotics. Articles will also explore feeling worlds very unlike those of our 
own species, to extend our mind-reading ability even to the point of trying to answer 
questions like “What does it feel like to be a bat?” (Nagel 1974; Hughes 1999; Jones 2005). 
 
Open peer commentary. Because of the subject matter of ASent, the topic of every article 
will be controversial in one way or another, with potential implications for many fields. After 
articles have been refereed and accepted for publication, ASent will invite “open peer 
commentary” from the leading specialists on the topic of each “target” article, across 
disciplines and around the world. This peer commentary will consist of multiple shorter 
articles by experts from different fields and perspectives, elaborating, applying, 
supplementing and criticizing the content of the target article, along with responses from the 
target author. Commentaries can also be submitted for consideration without invitation. All 
target articles will be peer-reviewed, and all commentaries will be editorially reviewed. 
 
As the editor-in-chief of Animal Sentience, I am not new to open peer commentary. I founded 
and for over twenty years edited the journal Behavioral and Brain Sciences (BBS), published 
by Cambridge University Press. BBS, too, was an open-peer-commentary journal. After I had 
stepped down from its helm, I had no intention of editing a journal ever again. But when long-
time BBS Associate and commentator Andrew Rowan (1990), President of the Humane 
Society International, approached me to ask whether I would agree to edit a journal on animal 
sentience, it took me exactly 10 milliseconds to look into my heart and know I would do it — 
that I had to do it, in fact (Bekoff & Harnad 2015). Nonhuman animals, after incalculable and 
unpardonable suffering at the hands of our species, may now be beginning to have some hope 
of being accorded legal status and protection as sentient beings6 (D'Silva & Turner 2012; 
                                                        
6 Projet de loi no 54 (adopted 4 December 2015): “[D]orénavant, au Québec, les animaux ne seront plus 
considérés comme des « bien  meubles », mais comme des êtres doués de sensibilité ayant des impératifs 
biologiques.” [“Henceforth, in Quebec, animals will no longer be considered as property but as sentient beings 
with biological imperatives.”] 
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Wise 2014). This is hence the historic time to build a clear and full understanding of what 
sentience is, species by species, and what is needed to understand and protect it. I hope 
fervently that Animal Sentience will make significant, substantive and lasting contributions to 
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Call for Commentary:  Animal Sentience publishes Open Peer Commentary on all accepted target 
articles. Target articles are peer-reviewed. Commentaries are editorially reviewed. There are 
submitted commentaries as well as invited commentaries. Commentaries appear as soon as they 
have been revised and accepted. Target article authors may respond to their commentaries 
individually or in a joint response to multiple commentaries.  
Instructions: http://animalstudiesrepository.org/animsent/guidelines.html 
 
UQÀM/ISC Cognitive Science Summer School June 26 - July 6 2018, Montreal, Canada 
The Other Minds Problem: Animal Sentience and Cognition 
Overview. Since Descartes, philosophers know there is no way to know for sure what — or whether — others feel 
(not even if they tell you). Science, however, is not about certainty but about probability and evidence. The 7.5 
billion individual members of the human species can tell us what they are feeling. But there are 9 million other 
species on the planet (20 quintillion individuals), from elephants to jellyfish, with which humans share biological and 
cognitive ancestry, but not one other species can speak: Which of them can feel — and what do they feel? Their 
human spokespersons — the comparative psychologists, ethologists, evolutionists, and cognitive neurobiologists 
who are the world’s leading experts in “mind-reading" other species -- will provide a sweeping panorama of what it 
feels like to be an elephant, ape, whale, cow, pig, dog, bat, chicken, fish, lizard, lobster, snail: This growing body of 
facts about nonhuman sentience has profound implications not only for our understanding of human cognition, but 
for our treatment of other sentient species. 
 
Gregory Berns: Decoding the Dog's Mind with Awake 
Neuroimaging 
Gordon Burghardt: Probing the Umwelt of Reptiles 
Jon Sakata: Audience Effects on Communication 
Signals 
PANEL 1: Reptiles, Birds and Mammals 
WORKSHOP 1: Kristin Andrews: The "Other" 
Problems: Mind, Behavior, and Agency9 
Sarah Brosnan: How Do Primates Feel About Their 
Social Partners?  
Alexander Ophir: The Cognitive Ecology of 
Monogamy 
Michael Hendricks: Integrating Action and Perception 
in a Small Nervous System 
PANEL 2: Primates, Voles and Worms 
WORKSHOP 2: Jonathan Birch: Animal Sentience 
and the Precautionary Principle 
Malcolm MacIver: How Sentience Changed After Fish 
Invaded Land 385 Million Years Ago 
Sarah Woolley: Neural Mechanisms of Preference in 
Female Songbird 
Simon Reader: Animal Social Learning: Implications 
for Understanding Others 
PANEL 3: Sea to Land to Air 
WORKSHOP 3: Steven M. Wise: Nonhuman 
Personhood 
Tomoko Ohyama: Action Selection in a Small Brain 
(Drosophila Maggot) 
Mike Ryan: "Crazy Love": Nonlinearity and 
Irrationality in Mate Choice 
Louis Lefebvre: Animal Innovation: From Ecology to 
Neurotransmitters 
PANEL 4: Maggots, Frogs and Birds: Flexibility 
Evolving 
SPECIAL EVENT: Mario Cyr: Polar Bears 
Colin Chapman: Why Do We Want to Think People 
Are Different?  
Vladimir Pradosudov: Chickadee Spatial Cognition 
Jonathan Balcombe: The Sentient World of Fishes 
PANEL 5: Like-Mindedness and Unlike-Mindedness 
WORKSHOP  5 (part 1): Gary Comstock: A Cow's 
Concept of Her Future 
WORKSHOP 5 (part 2): Jean-Jacques Kona-Boun: 
Physical and Mental Risks to Cattle and Horses in 
Rodeos 
Joshua Plotnik: Thoughtful Trunks: Application of 
Elephant Cognition for Elephant Conservation 
Lori Marino: Who Are Dolphins? 
PANEL 6: Mammals All, Great and Small 
Larry Young: The Neurobiology of Social Bonding, 
Empathy and Social Loss in Monogamous Voles 
WORKSHOP 6: Lori Marino: The Inconvenient Truth 
About Thinking Chickens 
Andrew Adamatzky: Slime Mould: Cognition Through 
Computation 
Frantisek Baluska & Stefano Mancuso: What a Plant 
Knows and Perceives 
Arthur Reber: A Novel Theory of the Origin of Mind: 
Conversations With a Caterpillar and a Bacterium 
PANEL 7: Microbes, Molds and Plants 
WORKSHOP 7: Suzanne Held & Michael Mendl: Pig 
Cognition and Why It Matters 
James Simmons: What Is It Like To Be A Bat? 
Debbie Kelly: Spatial Cognition in Food-Storing 
Steve Phelps: Social Cognition Across Species 
PANEL 8: Social Space 
WORKSHOP 8: To be announced 
Lars Chittka: The Mind of the Bee 
Reuven Dukas: Insect Emotions: Mechanisms and 
Evolutionary Biology 
Adam Shriver: Do Human Lesion Studies Tell Us the 
Cortex is Required for Pain Experiences? 
PANEL 9: The Invertebrate Mind 
WORKSHOP 9:  Delcianna Winders: Nonhuman 
Animals in Sport and Entertainment    
Carel ten Cate: Avian Capacity for Categorization and 
Abstraction 
Jennifer Mather: Do Squid Have a Sense of Self? 
Steve Chang: Neurobiology of Monkeys Thinking 
About Other Monkeys 
PANEL 10: Others in Mind 
WORKSHOP 10: The Legal Status of Sentient 
Nonhuman Species  
 
 
 
 
 
